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Concepts, Attention, and Perception 
 
 
Abstract 
 
According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we must possess 
concepts for all the objects, properties and relations which feature in our perceptual 
experiences. In this paper, I investigate the possibility of developing an argument against 
the conceptualist view by appealing to the notion of attention. 
 
In Part One, I begin by setting out an apparently promising version of such an argument, 
a version which appeals to a link between attention and perceptual demonstrative concept 
possession. In Part Two, however, I show how the conceptualist can challenge what 
appears to be the key premise of the argument, and I go on to describe, in Part Three, an 
important further difficulty which we face if we attempt to overcome this challenge in a 
particular way. My conclusion will be that the conceptualist’s challenge to the argument 
is convincing and hence that the argument remains inconclusive. 
 
Introduction 
 
According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we must possess 
concepts for all the objects, properties and relations which feature in our perceptual 
experiences.
1
 In this paper, I investigate the possibility of developing an argument against 
the conceptualist view by appealing to the notion of attention. 
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In Part One, I begin by setting out an apparently promising version of such an argument, 
a version which appeals to a link between attention and perceptual demonstrative concept 
possession. In Part Two, however, I show how the conceptualist can challenge what 
appears to be the key premise of the argument, and I go on to describe, in Part Three, an 
important further difficulty which we face if we attempt to overcome this challenge in a 
particular way. My conclusion will be that the conceptualist’s challenge to the argument 
is convincing and hence that the argument remains inconclusive. 
 
 
Part One: An Argument from Attention 
 
I begin with a statement of what I take to be the conceptualist’s defining claim:  
 
Conceptualism: Any (normal human adult) perceptual experience has the 
representational content that it does exclusively in virtue of its drawing into operation 
concepts that the subject of the experience possesses at the time of the experience. 
 
How might one go about developing an argument against this view by appealing to the 
notion of attention? An immediate consequence of the view is that we must possess 
concepts for all the various objects, properties, and relations which feature in our 
experiences. This suggests that we may be able to develop an anti-conceptualist argument 
with roughly the following structure: (1) attention is necessary for concept-possession; 
but (2) we do not attend to all the objects, properties, and relations which feature in our 
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perceptual experiences, so (3) we do not possess concepts for all the objects, properties, 
and relations which feature in our perceptual experiences. Is this line of reasoning at all 
promising? I think that it certainly needs some refinement, but that it illustrates clearly 
enough the central idea: we shall try to develop an anti-conceptualist argument from 
attention which is based around two main premises, one which has to do with the 
necessity of attention for concept-possession, and one which has to do with our not 
attending to everything that we experience.
2
 
 
What sort of refinement does our simple line of reasoning require? Let us start with the 
initial premise, which claims that attention is necessary for concept possession. We 
should note first that the exact notion of attention to which the premise is appealing needs 
to be clarified. However it also seems that whichever sense of attention is being appealed 
to, the premise is likely to be false as it stands. Consider my concept of conjunction, 
Henry VIII, or the Big Bang. In no obvious sense must I be attending to these things in 
order to possess concepts of them. In reformulating the first premise, then, it seems that 
we will need to do two things: we will need to isolate a class of concepts possession of 
which does plausibly require attention (of some kind or other), and we will then need to 
specify more precisely the kind of attention that is supposed to be required. Having done 
this, we can then adjust the other premise accordingly to preserve the argument's validity. 
 
Perceptual Demonstrative Concepts 
 
Which concepts are plausibly such that in order to possess them, one must attend to 
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whatever they are concepts of? One natural answer would be - perceptual demonstrative 
concepts. Perceptual demonstrative concepts are those concepts that one might express 
most naturally by using phrases which include a linguistic demonstrative, and they are 
concepts possession of which is made possible (in some sense) by perceptual experiences 
which feature whatever it is that the concepts apply to.
3
 So if I have a perceptual 
demonstrative concept of a particular shade of red, for example, this will be a concept 
that I can express most naturally by saying ‘that shade of red’ or just ‘that shade’, and my 
possessing this concept will depend on my enjoying an experience which represents 
something as being the shade.  
 
Conceptualists typically regard such demonstrative concepts as crucial since they seem 
best suited to capture the fine-grainedness, or determinacy of (in particular) the properties 
and relations that feature in our experiences.
4
 Only demonstrative concepts seem up to 
the job in this respect since it seems plausible that non-demonstrative, general concepts 
expressible by such terms as ‘red’ or even ‘burnt sienna’ lack the fine-grainedness of 
many (perhaps all) of the properties and relations that feature in our experiences. 
 
For our purposes, perceptual demonstrative concepts are important because they seem to 
be just the sort of concepts possession of which might require attention to whatever they 
are concepts of: while it is not plausible that I must attend to conjunction (whatever that 
might mean) in order to possess a concept of conjunction, it seems a good deal more 
plausible that I must attend (in some sense) to that shade of red in order to possess a 
perceptual demonstrative concept of the shade. 
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Let us accept, initially at any rate, that there is indeed at least some notion of attention on 
which it is true that attention is necessary for perceptual demonstrative concept 
possession. What exactly might this notion of attention be? 
 
Attention 
 
One mistake that we need to avoid making here is to think that one can attend to 
something in the relevant sense only if one’s eyes are focused on it. When you focus your 
eyes on an object, with the consequence that its image is projected onto a part of the 
retina called the fovea, you receive substantially more information from the object than 
you would have done had its image been projected onto some other part of the retina. It is 
clear, however, that you can attend to an object in the relevant sense even if its image is 
not projected onto the fovea in this way. 
 
The distinction that psychologists make between ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ attention is helpful 
here. Imagine that you are at a cocktail party and you are there in order to spy on ‘that 
woman’ over in the corner. But you need to make sure that she does not discover that you 
are spying on her. What you should do is to attend to her covertly but not overtly: you 
should look at the woman out of the corner of your eye, as we would say, while keeping 
your overt gaze fixed firmly on the man with whom you are making polite small-talk. 
 
The point here is that one can attend to something in the relevant sense without attending 
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overtly to it, without focusing one’s eyes on it. But this still does not give us a positive 
characterisation of the notion of attention to which our argument is appealing. One way 
to provide such a characterisation would be simply to identify the relevant kind of 
attention with noticing: we could say that to attend to an object, property, or relation, is 
just, in the relevant sense, to notice it. On this view, it is possible to attend to the woman 
in the corner, in the relevant sense, without attending overtly to her, since it is possible to 
notice her without attending overtly to her. 
 
Is the strategy of identifying attention with noticing satisfactory? An important point to 
note here is that if the strategy were satisfactory – if attention were noticing - then this 
would provide us with good reason to think that attention is indeed necessary for 
perceptual demonstrative concept possession. For possessing a perceptual demonstrative 
concept of something is possessing the ability to think about that thing, where the 
possession of the ability is made possible by a perceptual experience which features the 
thing; and it seems difficult to see why an experience should make the possession of such 
an ability possible unless its subject notices the thing in question. 
 
On reflection, however, I think it is clear that it will not do simply to identify attention 
with noticing. The reason is that attention is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon; rather, it 
comes in degrees. If I am experiencing two objects, A and B, where I am attending more 
to A than I am to B, it might still be that I am attending to B to some extent. Think, for 
example, of the defender who is man-marking the opposing team's star centre-forward: it 
certainly seems likely that he will be attending more to the centre-forward than to 
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anything else that he is experiencing, but that need not prevent him from devoting at least 
some attention to the midfield general trying to deliver the killer pass through to the 
centre-forward. Noticing, on the other hand, does seem to be an all-or-nothing 
phenomenon: it seems difficult to make sense of the idea that the defender might notice 
the centre-forward more than the midfield general, while still noticing the midfield 
general to some extent. Rather, the defender either notices the centre-forward or he does 
not. Ditto for the midfield general. So since attention comes in degrees but noticing does 
not, we cannot simply identify attention with noticing. 
 
For this reason, I think that we would do better to draw instead here on John Campbell’s 
characterisation of attention as a kind of experiential highlighting. Campbell writes: 
 
‘To illustrate…. the fundamental point about conscious attention, suppose that you are 
sitting in a lecture and your mind wanders off a little, the lecture fails to grip. So you look 
around idly at the other people in the audience, your gaze resting now on this person, now 
on that. In effect, you highlight now one aspect of your experience, now another. In 
effect, you put a yellow highlighter now over one or another part of your visual 
experience….’5 
 
Now suppose we follow Campbell in thinking of attending to a particular aspect of one’s 
experience as being, in effect, a matter of putting a yellow highlighter over that aspect. 
But suppose also that we have at our disposal not just one kind of highlighter which we 
are able to put over a given aspect, but rather a range of highlighters of different kinds, 
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each of which highlights with a different degree of intensity. On this view, if I am 
experiencing objects A and B, it may be that I am attending more to A than I am to B, but 
still attending to B to some extent, for it may be that while I am highlighting both A and 
B, the highlighter that I am using on A highlights with a greater degree of intensity than 
the highlighter that I am using on B.  
 
With such a conception of attention in place, we can explain what is going on both in the 
football case and in the cocktail party case: in the football case, the defender is 
highlighting both the centre-forward and the midfield general, but highlighting the centre-
forward to a greater degree; in the cocktail party case, while your overt gaze may be fixed 
firmly on the man with whom you are making polite small-talk, you can nevertheless 
highlight him experientially to a lesser degree than that to which you highlight ‘that 
woman’ in the corner. 
 
But if we do decide to appeal to this conception of attention as experiential highlighting, 
rather than to the conception of attention as noticing, is it still plausible that there is a 
connection between attending to an object, property, or relation, on the one hand, and 
possessing a perceptual demonstrative concept of it, on the other? To answer this 
question, we need to look again at the relation between attention and noticing. We have 
argued that since attention comes in degree but noticing does not, we cannot simply 
identify attention with noticing. But this leaves open the possibility that there may be an 
intimate relation of a different kind, other than identity, which holds between them. And 
indeed this seems plausible. For it seems plausible that if one attends to an object, 
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property, or relation at least to a sufficiently high degree, one is bound thereby to notice 
it. Perhaps the precise degree of attention which is sufficient for noticing may vary, both 
from subject to subject, and, for a given subject, from context to context. But given a 
particular subject and a particular context, it seems plausible nevertheless that there will 
be some degree, D, of attention, such that if the subject in that context attends to a thing 
to a degree equal to or greater than D, he is bound thereby to notice that thing.  
 
More crucially for our immediate purposes, though, it also seems plausible that to notice 
an object, property, or relation, one must attend to it at least to some degree. Again, it 
might be that the degree of attention which is necessary for noticing can vary both from 
subject to subject and, for a given subject, from context to context. (And given a 
particular subject and a particular context, it might also be that the degree of attention 
which is necessary for noticing differs from the degree which is sufficient for noticing.) 
But the crucial point is that given a particular subject and a particular context, it seems 
plausible that there will be some degree, D*, of attention, such that in order to notice a 
thing in that context, the subject must attend to the thing in question to a degree equal to 
or greater than D*. This last point – that at least some degree of attention is necessary for 
noticing - is crucial since, as we noted earlier, it seems that noticing is necessary for 
perceptual demonstrative concept possession. So assuming that the crucial point is indeed 
correct, it follows that at least some degree of attention seems also to be necessary for 
perceptual demonstrative concept possession. 
 
 10 
Kelly on Attention and Demonstrative Concepts 
 
At this point, however, I want to discuss an objection to the view that attention is 
necessary for demonstrative concept possession which has recently been given by Sean 
Kelly. Kelly notes that in the literature, it is commonly accepted that there is a 'knows 
which' condition on demonstrative concept possession: as Kelly characterises the idea, 
 
‘In order to understand a perceptual-demonstrative term like “That person” (said while 
pointing in the direction of a large crowd), the subject must know which person is being 
pointed out. Without knowledge of which person is in question, the subject cannot 
entertain the proposition containing the demonstrative term that refers to him.’6 
 
But Kelly goes on to argue that, plausibly, a subject can satisfy the 'knows which' 
requirement with respect to an object in his environment without attending to that thing. 
In particular, Kelly's argument turns on an appeal to an interesting kind of blindsight 
thought-experiment: 
 
‘Suppose that the blindsighter has lived with his condition for many years. He's had a 
variety of helpful nurses and caretakers who have given him constant and reliable 
feedback about the various guesses about the environment that he sometimes makes. At 
first, of course, like any blindsighter, he resists the very idea that he has got access to any 
information about the environment at all. His nurses have to coax him into making 
guesses, from which he consistently disassociates himself. But with careful prodding, and 
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with extensive feedback, he eventually comes to recognise that the guesses he makes 
about the environment are remarkably reliable. Indeed, after years of practice he comes to 
trust his guesses about the environment in just the same way that a normal perceiver 
trusts his perceptions of it. He doesn't have conscious perceptions of the environment, of 
course, but he has a reliable, though non-conscious, mechanism for detecting objects in 
the environment and he comes to recognise that this mechanism is reliable. In such a 
case, I think we might be willing to admit that the subject, at least at times, knows which 
object he is non-consciously detecting.’7 
 
So according to Kelly, since it is plausible that the blindsighter meets the 'knows which' 
requirement with respect to some of the objects in his environment without attending to 
them, it is also plausible that attention is not necessary for demonstrative concept 
possession, at least not according to the standard view which holds that there is this 
'knows which' condition on possession of such concepts. 
 
The first thing to note about this argument is the rather peculiar logic which underlies it: 
the argument began with the observation that (according to a popular view) satisfaction 
of a 'knows which' requirement is necessary for demonstrative concept possession. The 
argument then went on to provide an example of a subject who satisfies the 'knows 
which' requirement with respect to a range of objects in his environment but does not 
attend to them. But it is not at all clear that Kelly is entitled to infer from this that there 
could be a subject who possesses demonstrative concepts of a range of objects in his 
environment without attending to them: given that satisfaction of the 'knows which' 
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requirement is only necessary for demonstrative concept possession, it might be that 
Kelly's blindsighter satisfies the 'knows which' requirement for the relevant objects but 
nevertheless fails to possess demonstrative concepts of them. (It is certainly not true that 
according to the popular Evansian line on demonstrative reference, satisfaction of the 
'knows which' requirement is sufficient as well as necessary for demonstrative concept 
possession. For Evans, a crucial point is that satisfaction of the requirement is necessary 
for possession of concepts of any sort (descriptive and recognition-based, as well as 
demonstrative)).
8
 
 
So it is open to us to agree with Kelly that the blindsighter satisfies the 'knows which' 
condition with respect to some of the objects in his environment while insisting that it 
does not follow that he possesses demonstrative concepts of such objects. But we might 
still think it independently plausible to credit the blindsighter (not only with satisfaction 
of the 'knows which' condition but also) with demonstrative concept possession. Should 
we in fact think this? It is not clear that we should. If we imagine, for example, the 
blindsighter pointing at an object in front of him and saying 'that object is F', would we 
really want to say that the concept of the object that he expresses is genuinely 
demonstrative? Or would we rather want to say that his concept is actually a descriptive 
concept, perhaps of the form 'the object that I am pointing at', or 'the object that I am 
detecting'? To my mind at least, the latter alternative seems rather more plausible. 
 
But more importantly, I think that even if we accepted Kelly's conclusion, it would not 
threaten the idea that, in the sense relevant to our anti-conceptualist argument from 
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attention, attention is necessary for perceptual demonstrative concept possession. Recall 
that according to our characterisation of perceptual demonstrative concepts, they are 
concepts possession of which is made possible by perceptual experiences which feature 
whatever it is that the concepts apply to. But by hypothesis, Kelly's blindsighter does not 
experience the relevant objects in his environment. Hence it seems that regardless of 
whether the blindsighter succeeds in acquiring some sort of demonstrative concepts of the 
objects in his environment, these concepts would not in any case count as perceptual 
demonstrative concepts, at least not in the sense relevant to our argument.  
 
(Might Kelly object to our characterisation of perceptual demonstrative concepts as those 
concepts possession of which is made possible by perceptual experiences which feature 
whatever it is that the concepts apply to? Perhaps. But a dispute over which types of 
demonstrative concepts count as ‘perceptual’ looks suspiciously terminological. Just as it 
is open to Kelly to understand the notion of a ‘perceptual demonstrative concept’ in a 
broader sense if he chooses, so too it is open to us to understand it in a narrower sense. 
The important point for our purposes is that whichever notion of ‘perceptual 
demonstrative concept’ we decide to use in constructing our anti-conceptualist argument 
from attention, we should remain consistent in this use so as to avoid risk of 
equivocation.) 
 
The upshot is, I believe, that regardless of the success or failure of Kelly's argument on 
its own terms (and as I have indicated, I remain sceptical), we can be confident that the 
argument does not threaten the idea that according to a perfectly respectable sense of the 
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expression 'perceptual demonstrative concept', attention is necessary for perceptual 
demonstrative concept possession. 
 
Adjusting the Argument 
 
I think, then, that the view that attention is necessary for perceptual demonstrative 
concept possession remains an attractive one. Where does this leave our argument from 
attention? It seems we are now in a position to reformulate the first premise as this: 
 
P1: To possess a perceptual demonstrative concept of an object, property, or relation, one 
must attend (at least to some extent) to that object, property, or relation. 
 
But in conjunction with our original second premise, which claimed that we do not attend 
to all the objects, properties, and relations which feature in our perceptual experiences, P1 
does not yield the envisaged anti-conceptualist conclusion. For the two premises are 
jointly consistent with the possibility that we may possess non perceptual-demonstrative 
concepts (i.e. - concepts which are not perceptual demonstrative) for those objects, 
properties, and relations which feature in our experiences and to which we do not attend.  
 
To remedy this problem, it seems that the argument really needs two other premises, 
aside from P1: it needs a premise which says that, for at least some of the objects, 
properties, and relations which feature in our experiences, we do not possess non 
perceptual-demonstrative concepts for such features; and it needs a premise which says 
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that we do not attend (to any extent) to at least some of these features: 
 
P2: There are some objects, properties, or relations which feature in our perceptual 
experiences for which we do not possess non perceptual-demonstrative concepts. (Call 
these objects, properties, or relations for which we do not possess non perceptual-
demonstrative concepts NND features.) 
 
P3: We do not attend (to any extent) to at least some of the NND features which feature 
in our perceptual experiences. 
 
If true, P1, P2, and P3 would together establish that we do not possess concepts for all the 
objects, properties, and relations which feature in our perceptual experiences. The 
conceptualist must therefore challenge (at least) one of these premises. Which of them 
should he try to challenge? We have already provided some intuitive reasons in favour of 
P1, and we have also seen that it is not threatened by Kelly's argument. What of P2 and 
P3? 
 
P2 seems difficult to deny. As we noted above, it seems very plausible that non-
demonstrative, general concepts lack the fine-grainedness of many of the properties and 
relations that feature in our experiences. Admittedly, it might be possible for us to 
possess concepts which match the fine-grainedness of the properties and relations that 
feature in our experiences, but which are neither general nor perceptual demonstrative: 
these would be concepts which are demonstrative, but possession of which is not made 
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possible by perceptual experiences which feature whatever it is that the concepts apply to 
- i.e. demonstrative concepts of the sort that Kelly's blindsighter possesses, if indeed he 
possesses demonstrative concepts of any sort. It seems clear, however, that to possess 
such concepts (assuming that this is indeed possible), one would need to undergo 
precisely the sort of extensive training that Kelly's blindsighter undergoes; so given that 
we do not in fact undergo such training, it seems clear that we do not possess concepts of 
this sort. 
 
I think it is safe to say, then, that the conceptualist will not be able to mount a convincing 
challenge to P2: there will indeed be some objects, properties, or relations which feature 
in our perceptual experiences which are such that if we possess concepts of them at all, 
then they will be perceptual demonstrative concepts, possession of which is made 
possible by perceptual experiences which feature whatever it is that the concepts apply to. 
In short, some of the objects, properties, or relations which feature in our experiences will 
indeed be NND features. 
 
This suggests that the conceptualist will be best advised to concentrate his efforts on 
challenging P3. P3 states that we do not attend (to any extent) to at least some of the 
NND features which feature in our perceptual experiences. This is a claim about NND 
features: those objects, properties and relations for which we do not possess non 
perceptual-demonstrative concepts. But I think that we can safely set the NND 
feature/non-NND feature distinction to one side for the time being and focus on the 
slightly more general question of whether we attend (at least to some extent) to all the 
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objects, properties, and relations (NND features or not) that feature our experiences. For 
it seems that the key issue here is whether an object, property, or relation can feature in 
one’s experience if one does not attend to it. And this seems to have little to do with 
whether the object, property, or relation in question is an NND feature: the issue of 
whether an object, property, or relation can feature in my experience if I do not attend to 
it, on the one hand, and the issue of whether I happen to possess a non perceptual-
demonstrative concept for that object, property, or relation, on the other, seem simply to 
be unrelated.   
 
So instead of considering P3 directly, let us rather consider the more general claim that it 
entails: the claim that we do not attend (to any extent) to at least some of the objects, 
properties, and relations that feature in our experiences. Let us call this more general 
claim P3*. Is P3* true? 
 
Part Two: The Difficulty of Arguing for P3* 
 
The Concept of Highlighting 
 
 
An initial way in which we might try to argue for P3* would be by straightforward appeal 
to the very concept of the kind of attention with which we are concerned. Recall that the 
kind of attention that is relevant here is a form of highlighting: one’s attending to a 
particular aspect of one’s experience is, in effect, a matter of one’s putting a yellow 
highlighter over that aspect. But surely, the thought might be, the concept of highlighting 
 18 
is related intimately to the concept of a background. In particular, one cannot coherently 
conceive of one’s highlighting particular aspects of one’s experience unless one also 
conceives of such highlighting taking place against a background which is not so 
highlighted. Granted, it may be that if one highlights aspects A and B, where A is 
highlighted to a greater degree than B, then B can in a sense form part of the background 
against which A is highlighted. But this still leaves the question of the background 
against which B is highlighted. More generally, the very concept of highlighting 
guarantees that, for whichever aspect of one’s experience it is that is highlighted to the 
least degree, there must remain some unhighlighted background against which this takes 
place. So the very concept of highlighting guarantees that P3* must be true: we do not 
attend (to any extent) to at least some of the objects, properties, and relations that feature 
in our experiences. 
 
Is this reasoning effective? My view is that it is not. I agree that it is difficult to conceive 
of one’s highlighting particular aspects of one’s experience unless one also conceives of 
this highlighting taking place against a background which is not itself highlighted. We are 
not entitled to assume without further argument, though, that the background against 
which such highlighting takes place is itself an experiential background. Perhaps the truth 
of the matter is that we highlight some but not all of the aspects which fall within our 
visual field, that we experience only those aspects that are highlighted, and that these 
aspects are highlighted against a background composed of those (non-experienced) 
aspects which are not highlighted. And the need to allow for such a possibility 
establishes, I believe, that one cannot argue effectively for P3* via a straightforward 
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appeal to the concept of highlighting. 
 
The Introspection Strategy 
 
What alternative strategy might we adopt, then, in arguing for P3*? One such strategy 
that might seem promising is that of appealing to introspective evidence. In particular, we 
might be tempted to appeal to the evidence that we can gain by introspecting on 
especially rich experiences, experiences that feature a large number of objects, properties 
and relations. For it seems plausible, initially at any rate, that the greater the number of 
objects, properties and relations that feature in an experience, the less likely it is that the 
subject of the experience will be able to attend to all of them. 
 
For example, consider the experience I would enjoy if I were to look at a large board 
covered in a mass of dots. We mustn’t assume here that I experience every dot on the 
board even if the whole board falls within my visual field, since, as we have noted, we 
must allow for a distinction between what falls within one’s visual field and what one 
experiences. Nevertheless it does seem tempting to think that in this situation, I can tell 
straightforwardly enough through introspection that I am experiencing a large number of 
dots, and that this number will be greater than the number of dots to which I am 
attending. 
 
I think that we need to be careful, however, in appealing to this sort of intuition in 
arguing for P3*. Earlier, we decided that if one does not attend to a thing (to any extent at 
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all), then one fails to notice it. If this is right, then to claim that I am experiencing more 
dots than I am attending to is to claim that I am experiencing more dots than I am 
noticing. But it seems difficult to see exactly how I could be justified, on the basis of 
introspection, in thinking that there are dots that I am experiencing, but not noticing. For 
if I do not notice a dot, then how can I be so sure that I am experiencing it? 
 
The Foreground/Background Distinction 
 
It is not immediately clear, then, just how the evidence that we are able to gain through 
introspecting on rich experiences can provide any support for P3*. At this point, 
however, we might suggest that there may be a different introspectively accessible 
quality of experience, other than its richness, that is crucial here. 
 
Earlier, we saw the difficulties facing the attempt to establish the truth of P3* via an 
appeal to the link that there seems to be between the concept of highlighting and the 
concept of a background. We agreed that one cannot coherently conceive of one’s 
highlighting particular aspects of one’s experience unless one also conceives of this 
highlighting taking place against a background which is not so highlighted. But it would 
be too quick, we then observed, to assume without further argument that the background 
against which such highlighting takes place must itself be an experiential background.  
 
But perhaps we might suggest at this point that we can in fact provide further argument in 
favour of the view that the background against which experiential highlighting takes 
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place is itself an experiential background. For perhaps there is significant introspective 
evidence to which we can appeal which would support such a view. Philippe Chuard, 
who has recently argued for a view very close to P3*, makes something like this sort of 
appeal, citing the following example of Barry Dainton's: 
 
‘You are sitting in an armchair, you have stopped daydreaming and have become 
engrossed in your book, which has taken an interesting turn, when suddenly the entire 
phenomenal background disappears, not just peripheral sound and vision, but mood and 
bodily experience too. The effect would be dramatic: it would seem as though the 
surrounding world had vanished, and your body with it. You would not feel the 
surrounding and supporting armchair; and since the surrounding room would no longer 
be present in your experience - save for the page of the book you were reading - you 
would be both surrounded and filled by void, physically and emotionally.’9 
 
The moral that Chuard draws from this is that: 
 
‘Clearly many of our visual experiences are unlike the one described in Dainton's 
thought-experiment. Phenomenologically, visual experiences seem to have a background: 
they represent more than just what is attended to or noticed.’10 
 
So the suggestion is that through introspection, we can find at the level of experience a 
difference between the foreground and the background, and that we should account for 
this by saying that there is a corresponding difference between those experiential features 
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to which we do attend, on the one hand, and those experiential features to which we do 
not attend, on the other. 
 
I am not sure, though, that this suggestion is correct. I agree that since it certainly seems 
right that most of our experiences are not at all like the one that Dainton describes, we do 
need to make room, at the level of experience, for some sort of foreground/background 
distinction. And this remains so even if one maintains that there is, in addition, a wholly 
non-experiential background against which experiential highlighting can take place. But I 
do not think that we can infer from this that our experiences represent some features that 
we do not attend to (and hence that P3* is true). For I think that we can give a plausible 
account of the foreground/background distinction that there seems to be at the level of 
experience, while maintaining that we do attend to every feature that we experience. 
 
Earlier we observed that attention comes in degrees. If I am experiencing two objects, A, 
and B, where I am attending more to A than I am to B, it might still be that I am attending 
to B to some extent. So in Dainton's case, for example, it may be that the experiencer is 
attending more to the particular sentence that he is currently reading than he is to the 
previous sentence, but it might still be that he is attending more to the previous sentence 
than he is to, say, the corner of the page. But given that this is so, given that attention 
does come in degrees in this way, then instead of accounting for the experiential 
background by appealing to experiential features that we do not attend to at all, we can 
rather explain it by appeal to the differing extents to which we attend to such features: on 
this view, the extent to which a feature figures in the foreground of an experience rather 
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than its background will be determined by the extent to which the subject attends to it. 
And this explanation is of course compatible with an insistence that experiencing 
something requires that the subject attend to it at least to some degree. 
 
It does seem possible, then, to give a coherent account of the foreground/background 
distinction that there seems to be at the level of experience without appealing to 
experiential features that go entirely unattended to. Indeed, I think that the sort of account 
that I have just sketched actually provides a better explanation of the phenomenology of 
the experiential background than the alternative account: in my own case at least, it 
seems that even among those experiential features which seem more generally to count as 
background rather than as foreground features, some such features still seem to be closer 
to the foreground than others. (Think of the football case again: the midfield general 
seems generally to count as a background feature of the defender's experience, but he still 
seems to be closer to the foreground of the experience than, say, the opposing team's 
goalkeeper.) And it seems very natural to account for this aspect of the phenomenology 
by saying that although the experiencer does not attend to any of the various background 
features as much as he does to the foreground features, there are still differences in the 
extent to which he attends to these background features. But of course it would not be 
open to us to provide this sort of straightforward account if we insisted that the 
experiencer does not attend to any of the background features at all. 
 
The Fundamental Problem 
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Moreover, I think that the initial problem that the introspection strategy faced still applies 
here: recall that the initial problem was that it seemed difficult to see how one could be 
justified, on the basis of introspection, in thinking that one is experiencing, but not 
noticing something - if one does not notice something, then it is not clear how one can be 
at all sure that one is experiencing it. Chuard's suggestion was that we do not attend to the 
features which figure in the background of our experiences. But again, if such features 
really do go entirely unattended to, and hence unnoticed, then it is not clear how we could 
be justified in thinking that they do genuinely figure in the background of our experiences 
(as opposed to not figuring in our experiences at all). To be justified in believing that 
one's experience of reading a book is not like Dainton's case, it seems that one would 
have at least to notice the relevant background features. 
 
Indeed the general problem here seems a pretty fundamental one for the strategy of 
arguing for P3* by appealing to introspective evidence. P3* claims that some of the 
things that feature in our experiences are things to which we do not attend. So P3* is a 
claim about the sorts of things that feature in our experiences. And one might think that 
we should look to introspective evidence in trying to establish the truth of such a claim 
since, generally speaking, it is possible to find out what one is experiencing through 
introspection. But the problem is that it seems impossible to discover through 
introspection that one is experiencing something to which one is not attending, and hence 
not noticing, since one can only discover through introspection that one is experiencing 
something if one notices it. Searching one’s experience introspectively for something to 
which one is not attending seems to be a case of searching a domain for something that 
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has the property of not turning up in the search. And this seems a hopeless task. 
 
Note that none of this need constitute a positive argument against P3*. It might indeed be 
impossible, if one searches a domain, to turn up something that has the property of not 
turning up in the search. But this does not establish that the domain does not in fact 
contain something with that property. And similarly, it might indeed be impossible, if one 
searches one’s experience introspectively, to find something to which one is not 
attending; but this does not establish that one’s experience does not in fact feature 
something to which one is not attending. The problem that we have encountered is a 
problem for the strategy of arguing for P3* in a certain way, namely by appealing to 
introspective evidence; it is not a problem with, or an argument against, P3* itself. 
 
But given that there is this problem for the strategy of arguing for P3* by appealing to 
introspective evidence, I think that we would do better to set the strategy to one side and 
investigate instead the possibility of arguing for it in some other way. How might this be 
done? 
 
The Discrimination Strategy 
 
One alternative approach would be to appeal to failures of perceptual discrimination. To 
see the basic idea here, consider the following example (borrowed from Fred Dretske):  
 
You are first shown one complex array of shapes and patterns, and then another. 
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Although the two arrays are very similar, there is a slight difference between them: the 
second contains an extra spot not present in the first. Since the arrays are so similar, 
though, you cannot tell any difference between them - for all you can tell they are exactly 
the same.
11
 
 
The thought then would be that while your experience of the second array features an 
element (the extra spot) which did not feature in your experience of the first array, we 
have evidence that you do not attend to this element: the fact that you cannot tell any 
difference between the two arrays. And if so, we have evidence which tells in favour of 
P3*. 
 
The argument is far from conclusive, however. Suppose we concede (though this is not 
obvious) that there is indeed a difference not merely between the two arrays themselves, 
but also between the ways in which your experiences present those arrays: your 
experience of the second does indeed feature a spot which did not feature in your 
experience of the first. The question would then be this: does your inability to tell any 
difference between the two arrays in fact establish that you do not attend to the spot in 
question? The answer to this question is ‘no’. Indeed it remains plausible that you (not 
merely attend to, but) notice the spot in question. The reason, in essence, is that (like 
attention) noticing is guise-relative: one can notice a thing under one guise but fail to 
notice it under another. So it may be that although you notice the spot, you do not notice 
it as an element which constitutes a difference between the two arrays. It may be that you 
simply notice the spot as a spot.
 
And if so, this would provide an equally good 
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explanation of your inability to tell any difference between the two arrays.
 12
 The 
conclusion to be drawn, I believe, is that the proposed strategy is ineffective: we cannot 
establish the truth of P3* by appealing to failures of perceptual discrimination.
13
 
 
The Memory Strategy 
 
A potentially more promising alternative to the introspection strategy would be to look to 
memory. The thought here would be that even if one cannot establish that one is 
experiencing, but not noticing, something by introspecting on the experience when one is 
actually having it, one can establish that one has experienced, but not noticed, something 
by later remembering what one earlier experienced. This strategy seems to avoid the 
difficulty that the introspection strategy faced, since although one must, in a sense, notice 
something in order to remember that one has experienced it, the noticing in question 
takes place at the time of the remembering, not at the time of the experiencing. 
 
Mike Martin adopts this sort of approach when arguing for the claim, closely related to 
P3*, that one can fail to notice how things appear to one. Of course, there is an important 
difference between this claim and P3* since, as we have seen, although attention and 
noticing are closely related, they are not identical. Nevertheless, if Martin’s argument 
were to turn out to be effective, then that should be of some interest to us, for it would 
suggest that we might be able to adapt his argument into an effective argument for P3*. 
 
Martin’s argument begins with an appeal to the following case: 
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‘Suppose that someone, Archie, is looking for a cuff link. He looks in a drawer but fails 
to notice it and continues searching the room. Eventually he gives up and leaves for 
dinner. On the way to dinner, he agitatedly thinks back to his search of the 
room…Suddenly he realizes that the cuff link was in the drawer but that he had failed to 
notice it.’14 
 
So the crucial question for Martin is whether Archie experienced, but did not notice, the 
cuff link when he looked in the drawer. Was this in fact the case? Suppose we accept the 
assumption, which Martin builds into his description of the case, that Archie did not 
notice the cuff link when he looked in the drawer. What reason have we to think that 
Archie experienced the cuff link when he looked in the drawer? This is where Martin’s 
appeal to memory comes in: the idea is essentially that we do have evidence that Archie 
experienced the cuff link when he looked in the drawer, namely the memory experience 
that Archie later enjoys on his way to dinner – the fact that it later seems to Archie that 
the cuff link was in the drawer at the time of his original search. 
 
Why should we think that this is so? Why should we think that Archie’s later memory 
experience is evidence that he experienced the cuff link at the time of the search? After 
all one might concede that Archie’s memory experience is evidence that the cuff link was 
there, in the drawer, at the time of the search, without conceding that it is evidence that he 
experienced the cuff link at the time of the search. 
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Martin would agree that Archie’s memory experience is evidence that the cuff link was in 
the drawer at the time of the search; but he would argue that this is only because Archie 
experienced the cuff link at the time of the search. For according to Martin,  
 
‘memories are sources of information about the past; they are also derivative sources of 
information, dependent for any authority they have on past perception.’15 
 
So the thought here is that it is not by magic that Archie’s later memory experience is 
evidence that the cuff link was in the drawer at the time of the search. Rather it is so in 
virtue of the fact that he perceived the cuff link at the time of the search. For had Archie 
not perceived the cuff link at the time of the search, then if the later memory experience 
were in fact veridical - if the cuff link was in fact in the drawer at the time of the search - 
this would be sheer fluke. 
 
There is clearly something right about this, but I am not sure that it is quite the point that 
Martin needs, or indeed that we would need as part of an attempt to establish the truth of 
P3*. The conclusion that Martin wanted is that Archie experienced the cuff link at the 
time of the search. Martin’s argument for this conclusion is that (1) Archie’s later 
memory experience is evidence that the cuff link was in the drawer at the time of the 
search, and that (2) this can only be so if Archie perceived the cuff link at the time of the 
search. (1) seems clearly true. (2) also seems true since, as Martin claims, the evidential 
authority of memory experience is dependent on past perception. But it is not so clear that 
the evidential authority of memory experience is dependent on past perceptual 
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experience. For if there is a distinction between perception and perceptual experience, 
then it would open to Martin’s opponent to concede that the evidential authority of 
Archie’s memory experience is dependent on a past perception, without conceding that it 
is dependent on a past perceptual experience. 
 
The idea here would be this. The evidential authority of Archie’s memory experience is 
clearly, in some sense, dependent on his having perceived the cuff link at the time of the 
search. But since Archie did not notice the cuff link at the time of the search (Martin’s 
opponent might claim) his perceiving the cuff-link cannot have been a genuinely 
experiential episode: Archie must have taken in information from the cuff link at the time 
of the search, but this information must have been taken in at the sub-personal level, not 
at the personal level. So the evidential authority of Archie’s memory experience is indeed 
dependent on his having perceived the cuff link at the time of the search but in the sense 
that it is dependent on Archie’s having appropriately taken in information from the cuff 
link at the sub-personal level. 
 
Indeed, I myself take this to be an effective response to Martin’s argument: I cannot see 
anything to prevent Martin’s opponent from replying to him by distinguishing between 
perception and perceptual experience in this way. And given this, I think that we need to 
conclude that Martin’s strategy fails: we will not be able to establish the truth of P3* by 
appealing to memory. 
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Part Three: Re-adjusting the Argument 
 
The position, then, is this. We have seen that given the plausibility of the first two 
premises of our argument from attention, it seems that the conceptualist has to respond to 
the argument by challenging P3. But we have also seen that the conceptualist may well be 
able to do this convincingly, since he can point to apparently serious difficulties which 
face the various strategies that might be adopted in arguing for the parallel claim P3*. 
 
Does this mean that we should concede defeat at this point and admit that our challenge 
to the conceptualist has failed? My view is that we should not. I agree that given our 
failure to find any effective argument in favour of P3*, we should concede that our 
argument from attention, as it stands, is not conclusive. However, we need also to 
investigate the possibility, I believe, that there may yet remain a more promising version 
of the argument available to us, a version the effectiveness of which does not rely on 
there existing any effective argument in favour of P3*. 
 
The Idea 
 
How might we arrive at this potentially more promising version of the argument? To see 
how, we need to look again at what we took to be the fundamental problem for the 
strategy of arguing for P3* via an appeal to introspection. We decided that the 
fundamental problem for such a strategy consists in this fact: it seems impossible to 
discover through introspection that one is experiencing something to which one is not 
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attending to any extent at all, since the fact that one discovers through introspection that 
one is experiencing a thing seems to entail that one notices it, and hence that one attends 
to it at least to some degree. But suppose now that whatever precisely the degree of 
attention that is required (for a particular subject in a particular context) to notice a thing, 
it is less than the degree of attention is that is required (for that subject in that context) to 
possess a perceptual demonstrative concept of that thing. If this is so, then even if the fact 
that one discovers through introspection that one is experiencing a thing entails that one 
notices it, and hence that one attends to it at least to some degree, it need not entail that 
one attends to the thing to the degree required to possess a perceptual demonstrative 
concept of it. So even if it is impossible to discover through introspection that one is 
experiencing something to which one is not attending to any extent at all, it might for all 
this remain possible to discover through introspection that one is experiencing a thing to 
which one is not attending to the extent required to possess a perceptual demonstrative 
concept of that thing. 
 
This suggests that we might arrive at a more promising version of our argument from 
attention if we revise 
 
P3: We do not attend (to any extent) to at least some of the NND features which feature 
in our perceptual experiences. 
 
to 
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P3 (REV): We do not attend to at least some of the NND features which feature in our 
perceptual experiences to the extent required to possess perceptual demonstrative 
concepts of those features. 
 
Our revised version of the argument will then consist of P3 (REV) along with the original 
second premise, P2; P1 drops out as redundant.  
 
So the idea is that this revised version of the argument may turn out to be more promising 
than the original version because it may turn out that we are in a better position to argue 
for P3 (REV), as opposed to P3, by appealing to introspective evidence. It will help again 
here to set the NND feature/non-NND feature distinction to one side and focus not on P3 
(REV) directly, but rather on the more general claim that it entails: the claim that we do 
not attend to at least some of the objects, properties, and relations (NND features or not) 
that feature in our experiences to the extent required to possess perceptual demonstrative 
concepts of those objects, properties, and relations. Let us call this more general claim P3 
(REV)*. The key point is then that the fundamental problem which was faced by the 
strategy of arguing for P3* by appealing to introspection seems not to be faced by the 
strategy of arguing for P3 (REV)* by appealing to introspection. Or at least not if the 
degree of attention that is required to notice a thing is less than the degree of attention 
required to possess a perceptual demonstrative concept of that thing. 
 
But how exactly should we argue for P3 (REV)* by appealing to introspection? What 
specific evidence is there which is introspectively available to us and which would 
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support the claim? Let us return to consider the case in which I look at a large board 
covered in a mass of dots. Suppose we are right to think that in such a case, I cannot tell 
through introspection that I am experiencing dots to which I am not attending to any 
extent at all. Nevertheless, the thought might be, it remains plausible that I can tell 
through introspection that I am experiencing many dots to which I am not attending to the 
extent required to conceptualise them individually - to think of them as ‘this dot’ or ‘that 
dot’. And if this is so, then it looks like just the sort of evidence which might indeed 
establish the truth of P3 (REV)*. 
 
The Problem 
 
There is a problem, however. For the conceptualist may concede that in a case in which I 
look at a large board covered in a mass of dots, I am indeed in a position to tell that I am 
not attending to many of these dots to the extent required to conceptualise them 
individually. But he might then question the idea that I am in a position to tell that I am 
experiencing these dots individually. Perhaps the truth of the matter is that I experience 
only a mass of dots, without experiencing individually (the majority of) the dots that I 
know must in fact compose the mass. And if this is the correct account of the case, then it 
no longer provides any support for P3 (REV)*. 
 
(Perhaps it might be thought incoherent to suppose that one could experience a mass of 
dots without experiencing individually the dots that in fact compose the mass. But this is 
not obvious. Some analogies with other forms of representation may be helpful here. 
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Consider, for example the contrast between photographic representation and linguistic 
representation: while it seems that one cannot photograph a mass of dots without 
photographing the individual dots that compose the mass, it seems one can write or say 
things about a mass of dots without writing or saying anything about any individual dot. 
And perhaps experiential representation is less like photographic representation and more 
like linguistic representation in this respect.) 
16
 
 
Indeed I think that the fact that it seems open to the conceptualist to provide such a rival 
account of the dots case illustrates a slightly different general problem which is faced by 
the strategy of arguing for P3 (REV)* by appealing to introspective evidence. For it 
seems that in order to establish the truth of P3 (REV)* by appeal to introspective 
evidence, we need to find a case in which it is clear both that one can tell through 
introspection that one is genuinely experiencing an object, property, or relation, and that 
one can tell that one is not attending to the object, property, or relation in question to the 
extent required to possess a perceptual demonstrative concept of it. And I think that the 
general problem is that for any given case, the clearer it is that the one of these things is 
true of it, the less clear it will be that the other is true of it. So if we find a case in which it 
is clear that one can tell through introspection that one is genuinely experiencing an 
object, property, or relation, it seems unlikely also to be clear, in such a case, that one can 
tell that one is not attending to the object, property, or relation in question to the extent 
required to possess a perceptual demonstrative concept of it; and if we find a case in 
which it is clear that one can tell that one is not attending to an object, property, or 
relation to the extent required to possess a perceptual demonstrative concept of it, it 
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seems unlikely also to be clear, in such a case, that one can tell through introspection that 
one is genuinely experiencing the object, property, or relation in question. 
 
The dots case provides an illustration of this problem: although it seems clear that I can 
tell that I am not attending to many of the dots on the board to the extent required to 
possess perceptual demonstrative concepts of them individually, it remains rather less 
clear that I can tell through introspection that I am genuinely experiencing these dots 
individually. And the problem seems then to be that if we revise the case so as to make it 
appear more plausible that I can tell through introspection that I am genuinely 
experiencing the dots individually (e.g. by supposing that I attend to the individual dots 
more closely), we are likely thereby to make it appear less plausible that I can tell that I 
am not attending to the dots to the extent required to possess perceptual demonstrative 
concepts of them individually. 
 
So although it seems true that the strategy of arguing for P3 (REV)* by appeal to 
introspection does not face quite the same fundamental problem which was faced by the 
strategy of arguing for P3* by appeal to introspection, it also seems that the former 
strategy faces its own, slightly different general problem. The end result seems to be that 
the prospects for arguing for either claim by appeal to introspection look bleak.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We saw earlier that it seems open to the conceptualist to challenge the key premise, P3, 
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of our original argument from attention given the difficulties which face the various 
strategies that might be adopted in arguing for the parallel claim P3*. In response to this 
challenge, we then tried revising the argument by revising P3 to P3 (REV). However, we 
have now seen that it will be no straightforward matter either to establish the truth of P3 
(REV), given the general problem that seems to be faced by the strategy of arguing for P3 
(REV)* by appealing to introspection. The upshot is, I believe, that we have failed to 
construct a conclusive anti-conceptualist argument from attention. 
 
What conclusion should be drawn from this failure? We are not entitled, of course, to 
conclude that it is impossible to construct any conclusive anti-conceptualist argument 
from attention: perhaps there does in fact exist an effective strategy, other than those 
which we have discussed, in which one can establish the truth either of P3 or of P3 
(REV); or perhaps there exists a version of the argument which is conclusive, but which 
has a structure quite different from those versions which we have considered. I think that 
we are, though, entitled to conclude from what has been said that insofar as the anti-
conceptualist wants to argue for his position by appealing to the notion of attention, the 
ball remains very much in his own court.
17
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Notes
 
1
 For expressions of this view, see (e.g.) McDowell, 1994, and Brewer, 1999. 
2
 An anti-conceptualist argument with roughly this structure is discussed in Chuard, ‘The 
Riches of Experience’. 
3
 One needs to be careful, in specifying the sense in which perceptual experiences make 
possession of perceptual demonstrative concepts possible, not to beg the question against 
either the conceptualist or his opponent. Both parties can agree, however, that a 
perceptual experience which features a particular object, property, or relation makes it 
possible for its subject to possess a perceptual demonstrative concept of that object, 
property, or relation in the sense that had the experiencer not enjoyed an experience 
which featured the object, property, or relation in question, he would not have possessed 
the concept. Cf. Brewer, 2005, pp. 221-222. 
4
 See e.g. McDowell, 1994, pp.56-60, and Brewer, 1999, pp.170-4. 
5
 Campbell, 2002, p.4. 
6
 Kelly, 2004, p. 280. 
7
 Ibid., pp. 283-284. 
8
 See (e.g.) Evans, 1982, Ch. 4. 
9
 Dainton, 2000, p.32; quoted by Chuard, ‘The Riches of Experience’, p.14. 
10
 Chuard, ‘The Riches of Experience’, p.14. Chuard focuses mainly on the implications 
of Dainton’s case for visual experience, but the point presumably applies to the other 
modalities too. 
11
 Dretske, 1993, p.273. Cf. Chuard, ‘The Riches of Experience’, p.13. 
12
 This objection to the discrimination strategy mirrors an objection that David Rosenthal 
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makes to the way in which Dretske himself appeals to the envisaged case. (Though 
Dretske uses the case to argue not for P3*, but rather for the claim that one can 
consciously experience an item even if one is not conscious that one is doing so.) See 
Rosenthal, 2005, pp. 113-114. 
13
 See Pelling, 2007, for further discussion of the relation between conceptualism and 
perceptual discrimination. 
14
 Martin, 2003, p.240. 
15
 Ibid., pp. 240-1. 
16
 Cf. Dennett, 1969, pp. 132-141. 
17
 Many thanks to Stephan Blatti, Jonathan Dancy, Phil Goff, Hemdat Lerman, Bill 
Lycan, Ram Neta, Galen Strawson, Daniel Whiting, and various referees - and to 
audiences at Reading and UNC Chapel Hill. 
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